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Human mimicry and Imitation:  




Abstract. Defining biomimetics (§ 1) as the imitation of models, systems and elements 
of nature for the purpose to solve human complex problems, the essay considers (§ 
2) some examples of that activity, like display technologies, and nanoscientific innova-
tions. According to the literature on the subject, the further section of the article (§ 3) 
examines the possibility of giving a conceptual framework for biomimetic processes, 
starting from the observation of its current insufficient development both on the logi-
cal level and on a wider philosophical one. The fourth section (§ 4) discusses the way 
through which an approach oriented to philosophical anthropology and recent per-
spectives on imitation can help us to understand this kind of phenomena at the inter-
section of human and (non-human) animal fields. In the final sections (§ 5), the text 
discusses the consequences of the biomimicry approach in the specific case of architec-
ture and tries to draw some conclusions on the way an anthropology and an aesthetics 
of human mimicry and imitation can be re-shaped including biomimetics among their 
assumptions.
Key words. Biomimetics, mimicry, imitation, bioinspired design and architecture, aes-
thetics and philosophical anthropology.
1. INTRODUCTION: BIOMIMETICS, BIOMIMICRY, BIONICS
Recent works in natural sciences and technologies have obtained 
a wide range of results connected to the field of biomimetics or bio-
mimicry, and produced an amount of artifacts such as bio-inspired 
devices, materials and, in general, ways to solve human problems. 
Defining biomimetics (§ 1) as the imitation of models, systems and 
elements of nature for the purpose to solve such complex problems, 
the following essay will consider (§ 2) some examples of that activ-
ity, like display technologies (ex. morpho butterfly and structural 
coloration), robotics (ex. geckos feet and their ability for adhesive 
reversal), and nanoscientific innovations (ex. nanowires, nanotubes 
and quantum dots). According to the literature on the subject, the 
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further section of the article (§ 3) examines the 
possibility of giving a conceptual framework for 
biomimetic processes, starting from the obser-
vation of its currently insufficient development 
both on the logical level and on a wider philo-
sophical one. The fourth section (§ 4) discusses 
the way through which an approach oriented to 
philosophical anthropology (especially Helmuth 
Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, and Roger Caillois) and 
recent perspectives on imitation (say Susan Hurley 
and Nick Chater) can help us to understand this 
kind of phenomena at the intersection of human 
and (non-human) animal fields. Comparing bio-
mimetic phenomena with theoretical issues like 
model and copy, imitative representation, repeti-
tion and difference, natura naturans and natura 
naturata, nature and culture, imitation and crea-
tivity, the argument will focus on concepts like 
“mimicry”, “likeness”, “assimilation”, “incorpora-
tion”, “adaptation”, “identification”.  In the final 
sections (§ 5), the text discusses the consequences 
of the biomimicry approach in the specific case of 
architecture and tries to draw some conclusions 
on the way an anthropology and an aesthetics of 
human mimicry and imitation can be re-shaped 
including biomimetics among their assumptions.
As Jeanine Benuys announced in her semi-
nal work on biomimetics, the main goal of this 
new discipline is to explore all the new chances to 
solve human problems inspired by the ways evolu-
tion has found out to cope with problems similar 
to them. That is why, she opens her book explain-
ing to the reader that:
In these pages, you’ll meet men and women who are 
exploring nature’s masterpieces – photosynthesis, self-
assembly, natural selection, self-sustaining ecosystems, 
eyes and ears and skin and shells, talking neurons, 
natural medicine, and more – and then copying these 
designs and manufacturing processes to solve our own 
problems. I call their quest biomimicry – the con-
scious emulation of life’s genius. Innovation inspired 
by nature.  In a society accustomed to dominating or 
improving nature, this respectful imitation is a radi-
cally new approach, a revolution really. Unlike the 
Industrial Revolution, the Biomimicry Revolution 
introduces an era based not on what we can extract 
from nature, but on what we can learn from her 
(Benuys [2002]: 2).
Beyond the revolutionary emphasis of the co-
founder of the Biomimicry Institute, the assump-
tion that «life on earth presents elegant solutions 
to many of the challenges that designers and inno-
vators face every day» has actually produced the 
data base «AskNature» where to find «biological 
strategies, inspired ideas, and resources» relative 
to cope one’s innovation challenges, in order to 
«begin to emulate the time-tested forms, process-
es, and systems that already thrive in balance with 
Earth’s complex systems»1.  
The word “biomimetic” made its first appear-
ance in Webster’s Dictionary in 1974, as John M. 
Harkness remembers, which included the follow-
ing definition:
The study of the formation, structure, or function of 
biologically produced substances and materials (as 
enzymes or silk) and biological mechanisms and pro-
cesses (as protein synthesis or photosynthesis) espe-
cially for the purpose of synthesizing similar products 
by artificial mechanisms which mimic natural ones 
(Harkness 2002, see Vincent et al. 2006: 471).
Nevertheless, it happened to the polymath 
Otto Herbert Schmitt, who designed and built 
an electronic device to mimic the propagation of 
action potentials along nerve fibers for his doc-
toral research, to use the word in a title of a paper 
(1969) and, probably coining it, to prefer “biomi-
metics” (1963) to the former used “bionic”, sug-
gesting that «presumably our common interest is 
in examining biological phenomenology in the 
hope of gaining insight and inspiration for devel-
oping physical or composite bio-physical systems 
in the image of life» (Harkness 2002). 
More than pertaining to a different meaning, 
the word “bionic” is mostly widespread in the lin-
1 Homepage of the website https://asknature.org/; about 
the Biomimicry Institute see also https://biomimicry.org/
what-is-biomimicry/ and, for a largest list of sites about 
biomimetics, «Sites web, projets et réseaux du biomimé-
tisme» in Chapelle [2015]: 341-342.
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guistic German world, as Bionik, although the cur-
rent definition of the term sounds like this: «Bion-
ics as a scientific discipline systematically deals 
with the technical implementation and application 
of constructions, procedures and development 
principles of biological systems. This also includes 
aspects of the interaction of living and non-living 
parts and systems, as well as the economic and 
technical application of biological organizational 
criteria» (Nachtigall [2013]: 3). It is a definition 
that seems to include a closer relationship with the 
field of engineering technology and more consist-
ent with the approach that, in a military context, 
the expression had received since the sixties as 
«the science of systems which have some function 
copied from nature, or which represent character-
istics of natural systems or their analogues» (Vin-
cent et al. [2006]: 471). That the etymology of the 
word itself is disputed between a union of “bion” 
(unit of life) and the suffix “-ic” (like, in the man-
ner of), hence “like life”, and a portmanteau from 
“biology” and “electronics”, stresses this inclina-
tion for technology and probably, along with 
the increased complexity of the term “mimesis,” 
explains the greater propensity to use the expres-
sion “biomimetic” outside the German world 
and for all those areas that go beyond the strictly 
engineering field, such as art and architecture or 
the cooperation in ecosystems (see, for instance, 
Rovera and Michelangeli [2014], Myers [2012], 
Chapelle [2015]).
In current use today, you can still see a large 
area of overlap if not synonymy between terms 
such as “biomimetics”, “biomimesis”, “biomim-
icry”, “bionics”, “biognosis”, “biologically inspired 
design” and similar words and phrases implying 
copying or adaptation or derivation from biol-
ogy. All of them can describe a highly interdisci-
plinary field, which «involves the understanding 
of biological functions, structures and principles 
of various objects found in nature by biologists, 
physicists, chemists and material scientists, and 
the design and fabrication of various materials 
and devices of commercial interest by engineers, 
material scientists, chemists and others» (Bhush-
an [2009]: 1446). 
2. BIOMIMETICS OR BIOINSPIRED 
TECHNOLOGIES
According to the idea that biomimetics means 
the understanding of the functions provided by 
objects and processes found in nature which 
can guide us to imitate and produce a biologi-
cally inspired design or adaptation or derivation 
from nature, we can summarize its main point in 
mimicking biology or nature. As Bharat Bhushan 
points out in his overview:
Biological materials are highly organized from the 
molecular to the nanoscale, microscale and macro-
scale, often in a hierarchical manner with intricate 
nanoarchitecture that ultimately makes up a myriad 
of different functional elements. Nature uses com-
monly found materials. Properties of the materials 
and surfaces result from a complex interplay between 
the surface structure and the morphology and physi-
cal and chemical properties. Many materials, surfaces 
and devices provide multifunctionality. Molecular-
scale devices, superhydrophobicity, self-cleaning, drag 
reduction in fluid flow, energy conversion and con-
servation, high adhesion, reversible adhesion, aero-
dynamic lift, materials and fibres with high mechani-
cal strength, biological self-assembly, antireflection, 
structural coloration, thermal insulation, self-healing 
and sensory-aid mechanisms are some of the exam-
ples found in nature that are of commercial inter-
est (Bhushan [2009]: 1446, see also Nosonovsky and 
Bhushan [2008]).
From the Chinese trying to make artificial 
silk 3000 years ago, through the many attempts to 
make airplane wings imitating bird wings and till 
the twentieth century’s innovation based on the 
use of biology as a library of shapes for architects 
and designers, there is a long run prehistory and 
a long-term history of people who have looked to 
nature for inspiration, not excluding «apocryphal 
derivation», «urban myth», or «product of over-
enthusiasm» (Vincent et al. [2006]: 471-474). In 
order to introduce a closer glance at the field, we 
can examine some examples on different levels of 
imitation: a basic one where a single product by 
nature is reproduced, a further step where we are 
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mimicking more complex strategies adopted by 
nature, and a third level mimicking some aspect of 
the evolution’s process itself2.
At a first level, we can meet, for instance, the 
‘copying’ of lotus. Lotus is a sacred plant in many 
oriental cultures. Why? Most people think that it 
is because its leaves stay clean even in a muddy 
pond. The reason is that drops of water on the leaf 
surface roll away and carry any dirt along with 
them (similar to what happens to mercury drops 
on a flat surface when we break our mercury ther-
mometer). 
It is the micro- and nano- structured sur-
face of lotus leaves which minimizes the drop-
let’s adhesion to the surface. The balance between 
adhesion and the droplet’s surface tension (which 
tends to induce a spherical form) determines the 
shape of the droplet on the surface. If adhesion is 
minimal, the droplet is almost spherical – small 
contact angle – and rolls away collecting all the 
dirt on its path (the same always happens for mer-
cury, because of its huge surface tension). If adhe-
sion dominates, the contact angle is large.
Lotus bioinspired technology are subsequently 
self-cleaning surfaces obtained by structuring the 
surface or spraying micro- or nano-particles on 
the surface.  
At the same level, we can quote devices 
inspired by geckos. Geckos can walk on smooth 
walls and upside-down across ceilings. They can 
stay attached as if they were glued, but they are 
not: they can attach and detach their toes for all 
their life. No glue, and also no suckers, which 
would not be easy to attach and detach. What is 
the trick? The fact is that their toes are covered by 
sub-micrometric setae and setulae, each of which 
is subject to a minuscule attractive force towards 
the surface. This force, that scientists call Van 
Der Waals interaction, is always present but typi-
cally negligible on the macroscopic scale. However 
in the case of geckos the net effect of the many 
2 In the following paragraphs a series of examples will be 
summarized; see detailed illustrations and bibliography 
in Jabbari et al. (2014) and in Le biomimétisme, source 
d’inspiration (Chapelle [2015]: 149-282
many setulae is powerful and sufficient to hold the 
gecko’s weight, and even more. What is important 
in order for the geckos to walk is that the grip is 
instantly lost when the direction of the setae is 
changed, with no need to exert a strong force.
Gecko bioinspired technology are special 
adhesives for some sort of Spiderman’s gloves, or 
e.g. for sutures in surgery.  The difficult part is 
finding the right materials to mimic the attach/
detach trick.  Early attempts by Andrej Geim 
(Nobel Prize 2010 for graphene) worked for a few 
cycles, then the setae attached with each other 
more than with the surface.
Another similar example of basic applica-
tion concerns the amazing and vibrant blue color 
of Morpho butterflies, which is due to structural 
coloration rather than given by a pigmentation. 
Incident light waves are reflected at specific wave-
lengths to create vibrant colors due to multilayer 
interference, diffraction, thin film interference, 
and scattering properties. The scales of these but-
terflies consist of microstructures such as ridges, 
cross-ribs, ridge-lamellae, and microribs that have 
been shown to be responsible for coloration. They 
have a complex architecture on their wings – mul-
tiple layers of cuticle and air— to produce their 
striking blue colour by diffracting and scattering 
light. This structure is special: the same colour 
is reflected at almost all angles. The same princi-
ples behind the coloration of soap bubbles apply 
to butterfly wings. The color of butterfly wings is 
due to multiple instances of constructive interfer-
ence from structures such as this. The photonic 
microstructure of butterfly wings can be replicated 
through biomorphic mineralization to yield simi-
lar properties.
Bioinspired technology connected with Mor-
pho’s wing coloration are artificial systems where 
color is also produced by structure rather than 
pigments based on toxic metals (e.g. Pb): photonic 
crystals. 
At a further level, the idea consists of mimick-
ing more complex strategies adopted by nature. 
Nature is fault tolerant. Think of our brain. If I 
bang on my head, some connection may break 
but my brain will still work … more or less. It is 
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redundancy that saves us. It is much less expen-
sive to make many imperfect connections and use 
redundancy, rather than aiming at fault-less sys-
tems. 
The same strategy may work in future elec-
tronics. As devices shrink down to the nanoscale 
where the cost of lithographic processing can 
become prohibitive, it may become convenient to 
give up on control and use cheap and less accurate 
processes plus redundancy.  According to Moore’s 
law, we can ascertain the empirical observation 
that, over the history of computing hardware, the 
number of transistors in a dense integrated cir-
cuit has doubled approximately every two years 
(Moore was the chief executive officer of Intel).
A third step in this progression can be the idea 
of mimicking evolution. Suppose I want to select an 
optimal molecule for a certain function: I can try 
to design the molecule as accurately as possible … 
but I have to know the system and the principles! 
Sometimes I do not know much about my system. 
An alternative strategy is to prepare many many 
molecules, just at random. Then try them, and keep 
the ones which work best. Then introduce random 
mutations on the selected ones, and try the next 
generation. Keep the ones which work best, and so 
on until you obtain the desired performance. This 
is how evolution works. Evolutionary strategies 
can be the only solution when we need to optimize 
without knowing much of the system at the begin-
ning. Often the result of the evolution allows us to 
learn a lot about the system a posteriori.
3. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
BIOMIMETICS?
If we consider the theory and practice of bio-
mimetics, we can conclude, as Vincent does, that 
no general approach has been developed for bio-
mimetics, although «a number of people are cur-
rently developing methods for searching biological 
literature for functional analogies to implement»: 
We think that this is only part of the required frame-
work. Although it is well known that design and engi-
neering are rendered much easier with use of theory, 
in biomimetics, every time we need to design a new 
technical system we have to start afresh, trying and 
testing various biological systems as potential proto-
types and striving to make some adapted engineered 
version of the biomimetic device which we are try-
ing to create. Additionally, the transfer of a concept 
or mechanism from living to nonliving systems is not 
trivial. A simple and direct replica of the biological 
prototype is rarely successful, even if it is possible with 
current technology. Some form or procedure of inter-
pretation or translation from biology to technology is 
required. More often than not, the technical abstrac-
tion is possible only because a biologist has pointed 
out an interesting or unusual phenomenon and has 
uncovered the general principles behind its function-
ing (e.g. the self-cleaning lotus effect). Only then does 
the biological principle become available outside biol-
ogy for biomimetic use. The result is often unexpected 
(e.g. self-cleaning buildings) and the final product—in 
this instance, a paint containing particles— seldom 
resembles the biological prototype (Vincent et al. 
[2006]: 474). 
This situation hints the author to conclude 
that biomimetics is currently «empirical in its 
approach», and not a new way of adapting ideas 
from biology: «if it is to build on current success-
es, and to be able to serve our technological soci-
ety, then it needs some sort of regularizing, best 
introduced as a set of common principles» (Vin-
cent et al. [2006]: 481). The Vincent and others’ 
proposal, assuming the practice of biomimetics as 
something operating across the border between 
living and non-living systems, whose reason for 
looking to nature for solutions is to enhance tech-
nical functions, leads them to seek for a logical 
kind of solution (Vincent et al. [2006]: 475). In 
this case, that means to present a logical frame-
work that could expose some important underly-
ing patterns, i.e. the TRIZ (the acronym of Teorija 
Reshenija Izobretatel’skih Zadach, loosely translat-
ed as «Theory of Inventive Problem Solving»)3.
On the other hand, Jeanine M. Benuys, in her 
defense of innovation inspired by nature, defines 
the sphere of biomimetics as a new science («Bio-
3 For more detail, see Vincent et al. [2006]: 474-481.
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mimicry») that studies nature as a model, as a 
measure and as mentor. It imitates or takes inspi-
ration from nature’s models, designs and processes 
to solve human problems and uses an ecological 
standard to judge the «“rightness” of our inno-
vation», learning from evolution what works, is 
appropriate and lasts. However, it should be noted, 
at this point, how this setting is subject to a non-
obvious equivalence between human and animal 
processes of mimicry. By this way Benuys puts on 
the same level imitation by human being and mim-
icry (ex. viceroy butterfly that resembles the poi-
sonous monarch butterfly) and suggests that Bio-
mimicry «helps animals and plants blend into their 
surroundings, or, in the case of the viceroy and 
monarch, to take on the traits of a species that is 
better adapted to its environment». And adds: «By 
mimicking nature’s best and brightest, we, too, have 
a chance to blend in and become more like what 
we admire» (Benuys [2002]: 295-296). But this is 
completely wrong, if we seek a theoretical frame-
work for biomimetic processes, and not simply a 
logical operational tool, we have to turn rather to a 
more broadly philosophical context.
4. BIOMIMETICS AND SOME PERSPECTIVES 
ON MIMICRY AND IMITATION
Actually, even if we use the same word «mim-
icry» (or mimetics) which refers to unconscious 
processes of bodies’ tropology working below the 
level of consciousness, we are facing here – on the 
contrary – an entirely intentional process of imita-
tion. Mimicry can also be interpreted as applying 
to human being a sort of unconscious adaptation 
to the model mimic/model/dupe, like in the para-
digm of «Human mimicry», or as luxury and use-
lessness, like in Roger Caillois, but it can never be 
understood as an intentional behavior at an animal 
level. When we speak – for instance – about blend 
in for military purposes, like in the case of cam-
ouflage, we are actually speaking of an intentional 
behavior, i. e. a kind of biomimetics. In fact, the 
two perspectives, mimicry and biomimetics, rep-
resent – by this point of view – a sort of polarity, 
in which they are located on opposite ends of the 
process of imitation. 
It was Kyung-Ho Cha who reconstructed 
the paradigm and fortunes between Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Century of the «human mimicry» 
(Humanmimikry) which gives human beings a 
mimetic capacity similar to that of animals, espe-
cially insects4. By «human mimicry», he refers to 
a process of adaptation, with which a similarity is 
established with a model or with the environment 
and where the views on resemblance depend on 
the interest of the observer, for which the adap-
tation can be of physical or psychic type. Con-
sequently, a human being can exert on another 
human being an effect similar to that of the envi-
ronment on an insect (Cha [2010]: 14). On this 
basis, the phenomenon in which there is an assim-
ilation between a human being and the social 
environment that surrounds him/her – so that 
he/she moves, speaks, writes, thinks and feels like 
his/her social environment, and finally, becomes 
physically alike to the people around him/her – is 
made equivalent to the assimilation to the natu-
ral environment of an animal. This way, the man 
of mimicry (Mimikrymensch) becomes a homo 
adaptivius par excellence. Cha’s criticism focuses 
on this paradigm and considers it a mythology or 
poetic evolution and, more importantly, identifies 
it with a fallacy, a false inference that wrongly rec-
ognized (intentional) mimesis with mimicry. The 
structure of this idiosyncratic scientistic myth is 
revealed in two considerable aspects. The first is 
the assumption that the human mimicry evolves 
from that of insects and represents their human 
counterpart. Such anthropogenic representation 
is based on the inference that «it must necessarily 
be given a mimicry of human beings, since there 
is one of the insects». The second structural aspect 
consists of «a naturalistic fallacy, which leads to 
misunderstand (intentional) mimesis for mimetics 
(Cha [2010]: 16).
If the distinction between intentional imitation 
and mimicry is undoubtedly a gain of this criti-
cism, however, in this perspective, the problem 
4 See Cha (2010).
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of giving account to what stays below the level of 
consciousness in many mimetic human phenom-
ena still remains open. The work of Roger Caillois 
has led the attention precisely on that, at his time, 
with his anti-utilitaristic «instinct of letting go» as 
an antidote (Caillois [2003]: 91-103)5, albeit right-
ly criticized by Cha ([2010]: 83-90).
As we will also see about the biomimicry, in 
fact, to detect the intentional imitation, as distin-
guished from the animal level, does not neces-
sarily mean to exclude a dimension of mimetic 
phenomena that have no direct access to the con-
scious level.
Anyway, coming back to biomimetics, we 
can observe that we are in presence here of what 
Helmuth Plessner calls «intentional re-making» 
(Nachmachen) which proceeds starting from an 
«act of distancing» (Distanzierung) rather than 
from an «act of identification», as in the other 
case (Plessner [1982]: 451). Although – again 
in plessnerian terms – we are faced with an imi-
tation intended as «reproduction in a technical 
sense», in the case of bioinspired technologies, 
«original» and «copy» do not need to exchange, 
and although the process is bound to the existing 
model, just because they use –  as we have seen – 
the development of biological methods, the results 
can differ a lot from the biological starting point. 
It seems so to open spaces of originality and crea-
tivity in the reproductive process, where the rep-
etition tends to introduce a difference. In the long 
run of totemistic and material continuity between 
humans and animals, we can refer the imitation in 
biomimetics to the imitative representation evoked 
by Arnold Gehlen, as main anthropogenetic fac-
tor which objectifies terrifying elements and risks 
of the environment reproducing them, and mak-
ing them available for the human action (Gehlen 
[1985])6. 
According to Plessner again, zoomorphism, 
the identification of humans with animals wor-
5 For a reconstruction of Caillois’ «dark side of mimesis» 
and «mimetic temptation», see Borsari (2003).
6 About Plessner and Gehlen on imitation and mimesis, 
see Borsari (2007).
shiped as gods, and the subsequent anthropo-
morphism represent the «basic stem» of the spe-
cific powers of representation, understood as the 
reproduction or presentation (Darstellung), which 
has developed both as a representation of the 
self, the «drama» (Schauspielerei) linked origi-
nally to the priestly function during certain cer-
emonies and festivities, and as a representation 
of something external, other and alien, through 
sculpture and painting. «Imitation – concludes 
the point Plessner – is therefore anchored in the 
fundamental human constitution [menschliche 
Grundverfassung]» (Plessner [1983] 199). The 
current recovery of the concept of totemism has 
reached not dissimilar findings. Beyond the inter-
dict of the previous season, and its reduction to 
an «illusion», some works have examined the 
possibility of doing of totemism an «ontology» 
and a «theoretical model» which «underlines the 
material and moral continuity between human 
and non-human» (Descola [2005]). And, on the 
other hand, some other attempts have worked to 
the construction of a «zooanthropology» which 
considers human culture as an hybrid space not 
directly descended from the man’s phylogenetic 
characteristics, but also due to their extension 
through the mimetic inclusion of non-human, the 
relationship with the animal, exemplified by the 
dual nature of the totem (Marchesini [2007]).
If we look at the two volumes, which collected 
the most important works on imitation in the for-
mer decade, the Perspectives of Imitation edited by 
Susan Hurley and Nick Chater twelve years ago, 
we can observe that they do not mention biomi-
metics as a distinctive subject. Nevertheless, Nick 
Chater, in his contribution, tracing the difference 
between the emergence of biological complexity 
in Darwinian sense and the cultural transmission, 
notices that in the first case variation is random, 
not directed, and that selective forces operate by 
means of the reproductive success of the whole 
organism, not directly at the level of the individual 
genes. In the second case: «We often create delib-
erate variation and imitate creatively, guided by 
our goals; we intentionally select particular aspects 
of models to imitate and decide not to imitate oth-
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er aspects. Cultural complexity,» – and we could 
add here: «technological complexity as part of 
culture» – «unlike biological complexity, is largely 
produced by design; by sighted, not blind, watch-
makers» (Hurley and Chater [2005]: II.47). Finally, 
Chater argued that the analogy between biological 
and cultural evolution is only partial: 
Darwin’s deep insight that the natural selection may 
act as a blind watchmaker, creating complex designs 
from the slow and grindings operation of blind pro-
cesses of variation and selection, does not carry over 
to the cultural case. Cultural complexity works rap-
idly and flexibly because it is produced by design 
through the cumulative and deliberate operation of 
human intelligence (Chater [2005]: 362). 
In her commentary to Chater’s paper, Susan 
Blackmore discusses his conclusion about the 
relationship between processes of selection and 
human goals, referring to the modern case of 
massive design (Internet) where the human goals 
are «just one factor in selection» (Blackmore 
[2005]: 411). Without entering into the discussion 
on the memetic applied to human culture at stake 
here, what seems important in this criticism is the 
ability to distinguish between the different levels 
of the conscious intention in human intervention, 
on one side, and the set of interactions that plu-
rality and partiality of such interventions produce, 
on the other side. From the specific point of view 
of the argument on biomimetics this distinction 
could open countless cognitive and ethical prob-
lems.
5. BEYOND BIOMIMICRY? THE EXAMPLE 
OF ARCHITECTURE AND SOME 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL-AESTHETICAL POINTS
When we consider the specific domain of 
architecture and the way bioinspired design has 
changed its perspective recently, we can find a 
confirmation of this tendency to go over biomim-
icry and an example of the idea that the mere 
«copying nature is completely pointless». As Patri-
cia Pérez noticed in her Introduction to «the build-
ing/biology connection», «the use of animal forms 
in contemporary architecture – whether to endow 
a project of a symbolism, seek functional solu-
tions, or simply for esthetic reason – has become 
a recognized, indeed a commonplace, practice». 
And, she adds, «architects of the stature of Renzo 
Piano, Norman Foster and Frank Gehry, have all 
opted to use animal forms in some of their recent 
buildings». Her choice is to avoid a checklist of 
zoomorphism in contemporary architecture and 
to focus on «specific analogies with animal strat-
egies to protect the body from toxic substances, 
radiations, vibrations, impacts, humidity, and all 
other types of negative external influence, with-
out blocking contact between the exterior and the 
interior» (Bahamón and Pérez [2009]: 4).
This kind of analysis refers to anatomical struc-
tures, incorporated into the animal itself, to con-
structive structures artificially created by animals, 
and to preexisting structures that are appropriated 
by certain animals.  But the attempt to «natural-
ize architecture» can also intersect the «sources of 
molecular biology, down to the processes of rep-
lication, transcription, or translation of genetic 
material», under the sign of «hybridization»: 
Architects can generate complex models resting on self-
generation processes of matter and integrating computa-
tional, social, material or environmental variables. [… 
Architects] implement specific strategies to transcend the 
distinction between nature and artificiality. Mastery of 
the formation and growth principles that are specific to 
living organisms has inaugurated a genuine meta-ecolo-
gy (Brayer and Migayrou [2013]: 10-11).
It keeps closer to the original setting of bio-
mimetics, the search for solutions in architecture 
to achieve increases in resource efficiency, to shift 
from a fossil-fuel economy to a solar economy and 
to transform from a linear, wasting and pollut-
ing way of using resources to a closed-loop model. 
This approach also stresses, from an architectural 
perspective, the distinction between biomorphism 
and biomimicry, opting definitely for the latter one, 
as a «functional revolution»  (Pawlyn [2012]: 1-6).
As highlighted by different texts, nature cannot 
be copied, but architects and civil engineers find 
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in the living world a lot of analogies and sugges-
tions for their own creative design. The pioneer of 
bionic/biomimetics in Germany, Werner Nachti-
gall stated that the task 
is not to copy the forms, but to make an analogy of 
functions. Thus abstraction of general principles from 
the biological field and their technically adequate 
implementation. You often read, you just have to do 
everything like nature, and then everything is all right. 
This is the biggest nonsense. Copying is completely 
pointless. One has to abstract the stimuli from nature 
and install them where it is useful and practicable. 
Nature has its own forms and it is up to the 
architect to determine whether to use them or 
not, whether he/she imitates them or not (Schultz 
[2011]: 14-16).7 
Furthermore, William Myers has clearly pro-
nounced in favor of a development of the bioin-
spired design that goes beyond the biomimicry. 
Rejecting a «form driven» design approach which 
offers «only a superficial likeness to the natural 
world for decorative, symbolic, or metaphorical 
effect», he chooses a design that «sets out to delib-
erately achieve the qualities that actually generates 
these forms – adaptability, efficiency, and inter-
dependence», which is «infinitely more complex, 
demanding the observation tools and experimen-
tal methods of the life sciences» (Myers [2012]: 
11). 
In order to precise in philosophical, anthro-
pological and aesthetic terms this demand for 
creativity connected to natural processes rather 
than to the products of nature, it could be useful 
to introduce a reference to the thick tradition of 
reflection about mimesis. In particular, explaining 
Aristotle’s theory of artistic production in its rela-
tionship with nature, Gunter Gebauer and Chris-
toph Wulf remind that poetry, painting, and music 
«must create their works as nature creates».
What is intended here is not an imitation of nature, 
7 See also Nachtigall and Pohl (2003). For a further dis-
cussion of biomimetics in design and architecture, see 
also Biomimétisme (2017).
such that a work should be fashioned as the equiva-
lent of nature. The goal is rather to achieve similar-
ity in the processes of creation. Painters, musicians 
and poets should produce by means of the same force 
as nature. Like nature, they are capable of creating 
matter and form. The creative force in nature lies in 
nature itself; in art, artists fashion material in terms 
of a function they have themselves contrived. This 
process through which a work comes to exit in the 
world is what defines art, poetry and music8 (Gebau-
er and Wulf [1995]: 55-56).
The characteristic that defines the aesthet-
ic domain thus becomes «the ability of the art-
ist, painter or poet to create as nature does» and 
the specificity of such forms of artistic expression 
lies in the «processing of different elements into a 
consistent work of art»: «Mimesis creates art. Its 
objects, devices and representational forms serve 
goals conceived by the artist, rather than things 
existing external to artistic intention» (Gebauer 
and Wulf [1995]: 56).
It is something interwoven with a concept that 
a later modernity (Bruno, Spinoza) would have 
called «natura naturans», as a perpetual-generating 
activity or the capacity of nature to produce its own 
reality, considered as opposed to «natura naturata», 
or the complex of produced/created beings. Com-
menting Adorno’s aesthetic theory further, Gebau-
er and Wulf observe that «the work of the artist 
includes not merely the imitation of the objective 
world, but aims at bring object to speech»:
Similarity with the products of nature is not the 
aim of art; rather, it is similarity with the natural 
force that brings them into existence. When Adorno 
emphasizes the similarity between nature, the art-
ist and art, he has in mind, not natura naturata, but 
natura naturans. If artworks, freed from the obliga-
tion to posit identity, are equivalent to themselves, 
then this self-equivalence can only be grasped mimeti-
cally (Gebauer and Wulf [1995]: 289). 
Since mimesis in this context cannot denote 
«the imitation of something that preexisted the 
8 See Aristotle [1986]: 35 ff.
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work», they can conclude: «mimesis is similar to 
the self-referential creative of the natura naturans, 
the nonobjective aspect of nature» (Gebauer and 
Wulf [1995]: 290).
Finally, the question about how the anthro-
pology and the aesthetics of human mimicry and 
imitation can be re-shaped including biomimetics 
among their assumptions still remains open. Con-
verge toward its solution, however, a number of 
elements that we have so far collected by compar-
ing the different phenomena of biomimetics: inten-
tionality, the intentional character of the imitation 
involved in technical processes; its connection with 
the main factors of human development (imitative 
representation etc.); the embodiment of bioinspired 
functions in artifacts through distance and not 
through identification; difference in repetition and 
creativity in reproduction; the moral and material 
continuity between human and animals;  in general, 
the prevailing imitation of the productive capacity 
of the nature as including the imitation of its prod-
ucts: natura naturans over natura naturata9.
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